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1Perceptive is the Guest’s Eye 
“Perceptive is the Guest’s Eye” is an Ice-
landic proverb. The Guest is one-eyed Odin,
wisest of the Norse gods. The Martindale
Student Associates' essays fill one with
admiration and gratitude for these young
people who took the time to reveal the
Guest’s Eye. 
As the Martindale students point
out, after World War II Iceland progressed
from an underdeveloped society to one of
the world’s richest countries. Iceland’s vast
resources, highly literate population, and
geographic location all played parts. Yet that
was not enough. Iceland wanted to become
a global financial hub, a desire enabled by a
global tsunami of easy money. The combi-
nation of low interest rates, excess interna-
tional loan capital, and wave of debt securi-
tization that separated credit origination
from eventual credit risk seemed to create
money out of thin air. Iceland's bankers
rode the wave in 2003-2008, taking all of
Iceland along. 
In this age of easy money Icelanders
turned away from high-interest local cur-
rency, the krona. Businesses and, more fre-
quently, common citizens obtained loans in
low-interest currencies like the yen and
Swiss franc. That seemed like Valhalla for
the Icelandic people, but Iceland soon expe-
rienced the bitter taste of foreign exchange
risk. Something was rotten in the state of
Iceland and the global financial community
soon found out. Iceland’s prosperity was not
sustainable with an account deficit between
16 percent and 25 percent of GDP from
2005 to 2008. The krona was overvalued due
to inflows of foreign capital, resulting in
artificial purchasing power of foreign goods
and services and a bubble in housing and
equity markets.
The Banking Saga
The three major Icelandic banks were pri-
vatized in 2002-2003. At that point their
combined assets equaled 100% of GDP. But
in the age of easy money the banks grew
so quickly that by 2008 their assets had
increased to a staggering 1000% of GDP.
Dark storms of the credit crunch then hit.
Lehman Brothers fell and Iceland’s bank-
ing sector soon went bankrupt. 
The impact of the crisis on Iceland's
economy gave the government no option
other than to assume responsibility for local
assets and liabilities by establishing new
banks. This process protected domestic
depositors, but creditors of the three big
banks lost ISK 7,400 billion ($64 billion),
hitting bondholders around the world,
including high-street retail banks in the
U.K. 
Icelandic policy was eminently
defensible. Banks were private companies
and a fundamental capitalist doctrine is that
private failure is at the cost of shareholders
and creditors. But what about foreign
depositors? A significant policy challenge
came from time deposits in the Netherlands
and the U.K. in the so-called Icesave branch
of Landsbanki, one of the banks that failed. 
Icesave depositors, mainly British and
Dutch citizens, were not compensated by
Iceland's deposit insurance funds but
instead made whole by deposit guarantee
funds of the Netherlands and U.K. While
this bailed out ordinary depositors of a
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2bankrupt Landsbanki, it did not match
the nationality of the deposit insurance with
the default. Iceland's government would not
guarantee repayments to Dutch and British
deposit guarantee funds. It argued that
recovery of the bankrupt estate of Lands-
banki should cover losses—in other words
demanding an eventual solution to an
immediate problem. This bankruptcy work-
out, taken in a methodical manner by Ice-
landic executives charged with the diffi-
cult process of asset recovery, has worked.
Today it is evident that asset sales and recov-
ery from the Landsbanki estate will pay back
90¢ on the dollar. Short-term deposit insur-
ance paid by British and Dutch govern-
ments seems to have been covered by long-
term asset liquidation of the Icelandic bank. 
In spite of this solution, the Ice-
landic government and people are still pres-
sured on the differential treatment of depos-
itors. The Icesave dispute is under review
by the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) Surveillance Authority, which will
decide whether to take the case to the EFTA
Court. On grounds of good asset recovery,
Icelandic authorities have strongly opposed
that process. One question is what might
happen to the flawed European deposit
guarantee scheme if governments need to
bail out banks’ deposits. Would moral haz-
ard result in even riskier operations of the
banks?
Iceland’s Economy Today
The economic collapse fractured underlying
pillars of Iceland's economy:
•   The financial services industry’s total
meltdown means it will be decades before
rebirth of a global financial industry in Ice-
land. Some new banks have established for-
eign operations in niche markets like fish-
eries and geothermal energy technology.
Banks in Iceland will be based on local prod-
ucts and services and serve local clients.
High finance days are over, at least until
international markets forget the Icelandic
crisis.
•   Fisheries are the traditional export
industry of Iceland and one of the best
performing sectors. This industry is based
on some of the richest fishing grounds on
the planet, the intersection of the warm
Gulf Stream with the rich abundance of the
Arctic Ocean. Devaluation of the Icelandic
krona increased foreign-denominated lia-
bilities of these companies overnight. Luck-
ily this industry has a natural hedge to
foreign exchange fluctuation. Since export
income is predominantly in foreign
exchange, a rapidly depreciating local cur-
rency boosted worldwide demand for Ice-
landic fish products.
•   Fishing-affiliated industries in Iceland,
such as food processing, are also major
developers of locally produced high-tech
equipment. Fisheries-related equipment
and technology have become another pillar
of the Icelandic economy.
•   Iceland is a major producer of renewable
energy and renewable engineering and
drilling services. Iceland is one of the
largest producers of primary energy per
capita in the OECD, and energy has devel-
oped into a vital export. Through three large
energy-hungry aluminum production
plants that use foreign-sourced bauxite, Ice-
land is in effect exporting electricity by serv-
ing global conglomerates active in the
aluminum industry. 
However, the capital-intensive energy
industry is heavily dependent on foreign
financing. The largest electricity provider,
Landsvirkjun, was not heavily affected by
the crisis, because its income and accounts
are dollar denominated. Unfortunately,
other utilities had a majority of their
income in Icelandic krona but financed
their investments in foreign exchange. The
result damaged balance sheets and
increased the burden on consumers via
price increases.
•   The tourism industry was one winner of
the crisis. Suddenly a vacation that had been
outrageously expensive in Iceland is again
affordable to foreigners captivated by Ice-
land’s spectacular nature. This industry
has grown in spite of volcanic eruptions.
Fisheries, energy, and tourism
share a common attribute: they face short-
term fixed capacity. Iceland’s fisheries oper-
ate under fixed catch quotas with limited
opportunities to increase revenues, unless
world fish prices increase. The energy
industry is currently operating at full capac-
ity, yet further development is dependent
on foreign capital to import heavy equip-
ment produced outside the country. These
investments, already under pressure from
environmental politics, are stymied by
Iceland’s credit rating. The tourist industry
is seasonal, operating at full capacity only
in summer. While there are opportunities
for expansion if entrepreneurs can utilize
wintertime capacity, it is not obvious that a
large increase in tourism is available. 
Emerging industries are the wild card and
future potential of Iceland's economy-exam-
ple companies are Marel in food processing
technology, Össur in orthopedics, deCODE
in genetics, and Actavis, a generic phar-
maceutical company. Emerging industries
include online gaming platforms, IT serv-
ices, music, geothermal engineering serv-
ices, data hosting centers enabled by cheap
electricity, and the potential for a major
oil and gas discovery above the Arctic Circle.
Many of these new industries are limited
only by the imagination of entrepreneurs.
The future can be bright by using the well-
educated workforce in an increasingly
diverse set of industries, hopefully adding
pillars collectively more enduring than
the giant financial industry. 
It is complex and challenging to
analyze causes and consequences of the col-
lapse of Iceland's banks and economy in the
autumn of 2008. The Martindale students
made tremendous efforts in their analyses
of Iceland’s history, politics and geopoliti-
cal power struggle, industries, and gen-
eral economic progress. Understanding
these issues will inform both the coun-
try’s future policies and Iceland's debate
about joining the European Union. 
The Martindale Student Associ-
ates are “the Perceptive Guest’s Eye” and
it is a privilege to read these insightful
essays demonstrating economic and polit-
ical wisdom. As an Icelander to the Lehigh
Martindale scholars, please feel free to call
me if you see something rotten in Iceland
developing in the future.
Magnús Árni Skúlason
Founder and Managing Director, 
Reykjavík Economics, Inc.
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